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Abstract 
To what extent can the decline in British trade union density between 1990 and 1998 be attributed to declining 
opportunities to unionize compared to declining propensity to unionize among workers with the opportunity to 
do so and to compositional change? This question is answered using data to from both workplaces (from 1990 
and 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Surveys) and individuals (fro m the British Household Panel Survey). 
Results show that both falling opportunities and falling propensities to unionize accounted for membership 
decline during this period. Membership fell because unions lacked the power to maintain bargaining 
relationships with management, to organize new workplaces, or to uphold the ‘social custom’ of union 
membership among new workers who took union jobs. However, there was little evidence that declining union 
membership was the result of a change in employee attitudes towards unions. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Union decline was a marked feature of most advanced industrial economies during the 1990s. 
This decline was particularly pronounced in Great Britain. By unions’ own records, 
membership declined from 9.9 millions to 7.8 millions during the period 1990 – 1998. The 
Labor Force Survey (LFS) suggests that union membership as a proportion of total employee 
employment fell from 38 per cent to 29 per cent. In contrast to the US, where private sector 
union decline far outstripped decline in the public sector, unionization fell by similar amounts 
in both the sectors. Since 1998, union density has stabilized at around 29 per cent of the 
workforce, but despite the introduction of a new union recognition law in 1999, there appears 
to be little prospect of an immediate revival.  
 The purpose of this paper is to account for union membership decline in Britain 
during the 1990s using micro-data from workplaces, from the Workplace Employee Relations 
Survey Series (WERS) and individuals, from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). 
As such it builds on the results of earlier articles published in the Review by Beaumont and 
Harris (1995) and Disney et al. (1995), which examined union decline in Britain in the 1980s. 
The paper offers four key advantages over previous analyses of British union decline. First, it 
makes use of data from both workers and workplaces. Second, the use of panel data allows 
the dynamics of decline to be captured. In particular, how much of the observed decline can 
be attributed to behavioral change among continuing workplaces and workers, and how much 
is due to differences between new workers and workplaces and the workers and workplaces 
that they replace? Third, it is able to model the impact of changing employee attitudes 
towards unions on union membership. Finally, it utilizes a theoretical framework that 
distinguishes between membership decline that is the result of declining opportunities to 
unionize (mainly as a result of the actions of employers), and membership decline that is the  
result of unionization among employees who have the opportunity to do so. Bain and 
Elsheikh (1976: 58 – 81) established the importance of this theoretical framework for 
understanding union membership change, but previous studies have lacked the data to 
operationalize it adequately. Consequently the influential judgment of Millward et al. (2000) 
that union membership decline was the result of a ‘withering of enthusiasm’ on the part of 
workers lacks a strong empirical foundation. 
 There has been fierce debate on both sides of the Atlantic between those who argue 
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those who argue that employer decisions that deny workers the opportunity to unionize are 
more important 1. In Britain, Towers (1997) has argued that union decline has led to a 
‘representation gap’ while Pencavel (2003) has argued that there is little evidence that such a 
gap exists. While recent research has pinpointed the precise processes behind  of private 
sector union decline in the United States (Farber and Western, 2001), British evidence on the 
micro-processes involved remains partial. An adequate understanding of the mechanisms of 
union decline is important because the root causes of union membership decline have clear 
implications for union’s future prospects. As unions have the potential to affect the 
distribution of income, productivity and economic efficiency, and the creation and 
distribution of ‘social capital’ the future prospects of trade unions are a question of wider 
interest. 
 
 
2.  Union Decline in Britain 
 
There is a degree of consensus about the broad causes of union decline in Britain since 1980. 
Legal and public policy changes combined with high levels of unemployment, both resulting 
from deliberate policy decisions by Thatcher’s Conservative Government, provided 
employers with the opportunity to take the initiative in industrial relations. Increased product 
market competition gave them a strong incentive to grasp these opportunities (Brown et al., 
1997; Kelly, 1990; Pencavel, 2003). Towers (1989) has also argued that the changing 
composition of the workforce, for example the shift in employment from manufacturing to 
services and the growing labor market participation of women and part-time workers has 
been an important contributory factor. These arguments are compatible with one of the more 
authoritative recent accounts of private sector union decline in the United States, which 
argues that decline is the result of economic changes that increase employer incentives to 
exclude unions and raise the costs and lower the benefits of unions for employees (Farber and 
Western, 2001). Empirical studies have utilized the growing wealth of British micro-data to 
identify the specific mechanisms of decline in the 1980s and 1990s, but the picture that these 
studies present is incomplete.  
                                                 
1 For example, in the US, Freeman and Kleiner, (1990) argued that management hostility to unionism was the 
more important factor while Farber and Kreugar (1993) argued that lack of demand on the part of workers was 
the primary reason for decline. 
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 Analyses based on the WERS series have shown that union decline in the 1980s was 
primarily due to falling levels of workplace union recognition, which was itself the result of 
lower levels of union recognition in workplaces established after 1980 (Disney et al., 1995), 
i.e. reduced opportunities to unionize. Declining density within continuing workplaces 
between 1980 and 1984 did play some role in aggregate decline (Andrews and Naylor, 1994), 
but examples of de-recognition and falling union density in continuing workplaces in the 
1984 – 1990 period were comparatively rare (Beaumont and Harris, 1995). These WERS 
based studies are supplemented by two studies based on data from individuals. Arulampalam 
and Booth (2000) use panel data from a sample of young men to look at decline from 1981 – 
1991. They found that union decline among this sub-group mirrored union decline across the 
population as a whole. Green (1992) examined two cross-sectional studies of individuals 
from 1983 and 1989. He found that around one third of decline in density could be attributed 
to change in the composition of the workforce, and two thirds to within group behavioral 
change. However a key weakness of both of these studies was the lack of a consistent 
measure of the opportunity to unionize.  
 This weakness also applies to the work of Machin (2002) and Bryson and Gomez 
(2002) who have examined British union membership decline using micro-data from cross-
sections of individuals over longer time-periods; 1977 – 2001 and 1984 – 2002 respectively 
(Riddell and Riddell (2001) perform a comparable analysis for The US and Canada for the 
period 1984 – 1998). Furthermore, because these studies are based on cross-sectional data, 
they cannot measure the extent to which decline is the result of individuals leaving unions 
compared to a failure of new workers to become unionized. Bryson and Gomez (2002) 
partially overcome this limitation by using recall data to show that union membership decline 
ran parallel with an increase in never membership rather than a rise in former union members. 
The results of Disney et al’s. (1998) study using longitudinal data covering the period 1970 – 
1995 tell a similar story; union membership is highly persistent within individuals, but 
individual probabilities of unionization have fallen for successive birth cohorts. These studies 
all provide interesting accounts of how the union joining behavior of individuals has changed, 
and demonstrate clearly that behavioral change within groups played a much larger role in 
union decline than change in the composition of the workforce. However, understanding of 
1990s union decline is hampered by the relatively long time-periods covered by these studies 
and the lack of union coverage measures.  
 Research that specifically addresses the causes of union decline in the 1990s suggests 
that the causes of decline were different from the causes of decline in the 1980 – 1990 period. 
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Machin (2000) confirmed that the lower incidence of union recognition in new workplaces 
identified by Disney et al. (1995) persisted into the 1990s. But Millward et al (2000) found 
that union density fell in continuing workplaces with union recognition agreements as well as 
in new workplaces compared to old workplaces. Blanden and Machin (2003) found that 
unionization among young workers had fallen because the proportion working in union jobs 
had fallen and because fewer young workers in union jobs had joined a union. Results of the 
latter two studies suggest that the decline in aggregate union density was the result of both 
declining propensity to unionize and reduced opportunities to unionize. However, neither 
Blanden and Machin nor Millward et al measured the relative importance of these factors in 
explaining the overall decline in density.  
 In the absence of detailed empirical evidence on the micro- level processes behind 
membership decline Millward et al. (2000: 136) argued that there was a ‘withering of 
enthusiasm’ for trade union membership on the part of the workforce. This judgment, which 
was also endorsed by Pencavel (2003: 40) was based on information provided by managers 
on the causes of union decline in workplaces with union recognition. Managerial responses 
implied that new ‘alternative work practices’ (AWPs) like gain sharing, employee 
involvement and team working2 were responsible for reducing worker demand for unions and 
thereby reducing membership (Millward et al., 2000: 105). However, there are several 
grounds to doubt the accuracy of this information. First, rigorous empirical tests of the 
proposition that the rise of AWPs contributed to union decline found no evidence to support 
it (Machin and Wood, 2003). Second, theory would also lead us to expect that managers 
would seek to weaken and undermine trade unionism if they had the opportunity to do so 
(Freeman and Kleiner, 1990). Third, case-study evidence suggests that many managers 
behaved in a way that theory would predict. The work of Brown et al (1999) and Fairbrother 
(2000) suggests that union membership fell in response to managerial initiatives designed to 
reassert managerial prerogatives and marginalize trade unions. Although this work suffers 
from the usual limitation of case-study research, we cannot be certain how well the 
organizations studies represent the population from which they are drawn, both theory and 
the available evidence suggests that there was rather more to union decline than the 
exogenous shift in worker preferences that the evidence of management respondents to 
WERS98 and Millward et al.’s phrase ‘withering of enthusiasm’ implies.  
                                                 
2 In Britain, these practices are usually referred to under the label ‘Human Resource Management’ (HRM), but 
given the ferocity of the British debates over which practices constitute HRM the term ‘Alternative Work 
5 
 To sum up, there is a wealth of empirical studies of union decline in Britain during the 
1980s (Andrews and Naylor, 1994; Arulampulam and Booth, 2000; Beaumont and Harris, 
1995; Disney et al., 1995; Green, 1992). By putting together the results we can build up a 
fairly clear picture of the precise mechanisms of union membership decline; falling union 
density was primarily due to falling opportunities for workers to unionize. There are also a 
number of studies that cover a longer time period (Bryson and Gomez, 2002; Disney et al., 
1998; Machin, 2002). Because of the long time-periods involved, it is difficult to discern if or 
how 1990s union decline is different to union decline in the 1980s. These studies also lack 
measures of the opportunity to unionize. There are fewer studies of union decline in the 
1990s, and the studies that there are do not fit together to give a clear and unambiguous 
understanding of the mechanisms that drove declining union density (Machin, 2000; 
Millward et al., 2000). In particular, the relative importance of lower levels of recognition in 
new workplaces compared to dwindling membership in continuing workplaces is 
inadequately understood. Judgments based on a basic analysis of the survey evidence suggest 
that union decline was driven by the changing preferences of employees, while the case 
evidence suggests a key role for management in restricting union availability.  
 
 
3.  Measuring Union Membership Change:  Theoretical Considerations 
 
In a seminal contribution Bain and Elsheikh (1976) developed insights about the role of the 
business cycle in union growth and decline, originated by John R. Commons and the 
Wisconsin School, into a parsimonious theory tha t was able to predict union membership 
change in Britain, the USA, Australia and Sweden. The model has been subject to heavy 
criticism (which is in my view often misplaced) for failing to allow for the agency and 
strategic choices of union leaders and activists. (See Mason and Bain (1993) for a 
discussion.) It is also clear that even if the business cycle once explained the ebb and flow of 
union membership it does not do so anymore. Bain and Elsheikh’s original model failed to 
predict the downturn in union membership in the 1980s. A refinement of the model by 
Disney and Carruth (1988) corrected this failing, but given Disney and Carruth’s model 
specification, sustained falls in unemployment during the 1990s should have set the stage for 
union growth, yet decline continued (Metcalf, 2001). The enduring value of Bain and 
                                                                                                                                                        
Practice’ is preferred here. The American evidence suggests that AWPs do lower demand for unionisation 
6 
Elsheikh’s work comes from the insight that union membership change depends on two 
factors, the opportunity to unionize and the propensity to unionize3 (Bain and Elsheikh, 1976: 
58 – 81). Change in opportunities to unionize result from decisions made by unions about 
which workers to try to organize, the decisions of employers about whether to allow unions a 
bargaining presence in their workplaces and the power resources available to trade unions to 
persuade/coerce employers into granting recognition4. Change in propensity to unionize 
among workers who have unions available to join will depend on the preferences of workers 
and the ability of unions to uphold the ‘social custom’ of union membership (Booth, 1985; 
Visser, 2002). From this theoretical insight, union decline can be seen as the result of four  
specific micro-level processes: 1) compositional change; 2) declining union coverage; 3) 
reduced propensity to unionize among workers covered by trade unions (increased free-
riding); and 4) reduced propensity to unionize among workers not covered by trade unions.  
 Compositional change refers to changes in the make-up of the workforce so that the 
employment share of unionized workers falls while the employment share of non-union 
workers increases, for example, the growing employment share of weakly unionized part-
time female workers and the declining employment share of full-time male manual workers. 
The results of both Machin (2002) and Bryson and Gomez (2002) suggest that compared to 
within group behavioral change, compositional change played a relatively trivial role in 
explaining declining levels of workplace union recognition and membership during the 
period 1990 – 98. However, the analysis of Disney et al. (1998: 9 – 13) suggests that 
generational change has played an important role. 
 Operationalizing the concept of opportunity to unionize is straightforward with the 
BHPS, less so with WERS. The BHPS asks workers if ‘there is a trade union or similar body 
such as a staff association, recognized by management for negotiating pay and conditions for 
people doing your sort of job in your sort of workplace?’ Workers who answer positively to 
this question clearly have a union available. Previous analyses of WERS have used 
information from managers on workplace union recognition as the key indicator of union 
                                                                                                                                                        
(Fiorito, 1997 and 2001). 
3 The term propensity to unionise is often used to mean willingness to join or vote for a union. In this context it 
means ‘likelihood of unionisation’. 
4 In North America, the NLRA certification procedure has meant that that the democratic preferences of workers 
can be an important determinant of employer decisions about whether or not to grant union recognition. 
Britain’s ‘voluntarist’ legal framework meant that until 2000 there was no legal right to union recognition if the 
majority of the workforce wanted it, so union recognition usually depended upon the relative balance of power 
between employer and union (Wood and Godard, 1999; Disney et al., 1995). 
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availability (Disney et al., 1995 and Machin, 20005). However the drawback of this measure 
is that not all workers in workplaces with union recognition will be covered by union 
bargaining and representation arrangements. Indeed, Fairbrother (2000) and Brown et al. 
(1997) present compelling case-study evidence that suggests that the coverage of collective 
bargaining in workplaces with union recognition was rolled back by management over the 
course of the 1990s. Therefore, instead of relying solely on union recognition, both union 
recognition and the extent of union bargaining coverage within the workplace are used to get 
a measure of the opportunity to unionize. 
 Free-riding is the action of not being a union member in an environment where co-
workers have their pay and conditions determined by union bargaining arrangements. Olson 
(1965) argued that since any rational worker would free ride, unions must use coercion to 
maintain membership. A more plausible theory is that union membership is ‘social custom’. 
In other words, the union membership decision does not take place in a social vacuum; it is 
influenced by the decisions and pressures of friends, family, co-workers, employers, 
governments and unions. Habit and a desire to conform to social norms will also be critical 
influences on the union membership decision (Booth, 1985; Klandermans, 1986; Visser, 
2002: 408). The mirror opposites of those workers who chose to free ride are workers who 
choose to be union members even if they are not covered by union bargaining arrangements. 
Over the course of the 1980s and 1990s unions have taken a number of initiatives to make 
union membership more attractive to individual workers. However Kelly and Waddington 
(1995) and Waddington and Whitstone (1997) argue that this sort of initiative is unlikely to 
be successful in boosting union membership levels and reversing union decline. The BHPS 
shows that this type of individua l membership arrangement became more common between 
1991 and 1997, rising from 0.8 per cent to 1.6 per cent of employees. But, this growth was 
not fast enough or large enough to balance out other forms of decline. 
 One frequently cited reason for declining propensities for workers to unionize is 
changing worker attitudes and values. For example, Millward et al (2000: 235) talk about the 
rise of ‘a spirit of acquisitive individualism’. Similarly, an individualist ethos is also held to 
be a reason for low private sector union density in the USA (Lipset and Katchanovski, 2001: 
238). While it is well established empirically that collectivist attitudes and values and general 
attitudes towards unions (which are correlated with one another) predict union membership  
and willingness to unionize (Kochan, 1979; Lipset and Katchanovski, 2001; Charlwood, 
                                                 
5 Machin (2000) also used linked data from employees. However, so far employee data has only been collected 
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2002; 2003a) there is no empirical evidence that demonstrates a link between changes in 
these attitudes and values and union decline through declining propensities to unionize. The 
BHPS allows this supposed relationship between changing values and attitudes towards 
unions and union decline to be tested because it asks workers the extent to which they agree 
or disagree with the statement ‘strong trade unions are needed to protect the working 
conditions and wages of employees’.  
 
 
4.  Data  
 
Data comes from waves one and seven of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), the 
1990 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS90), the 1998 Workplace Employee 
Relations Survey (WERS98) and the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Panel Survey 
(WERPS98). WIRS90 obtained information from 2061 workplaces with 25 or more 
employees through interviews with the senior manager who dealt with matters relating to 
employment relations, additiona l interviews were also conducted with a senior financial 
manager and a senior trade union representative in workplaces where a union representative 
was present. Management respondents provided a rich seam of information about the 
activities of the workplace in general, and the management of employment relations in 
particular. Workplaces that had participated in the 1990 survey were then re-contacted in 
1997 – 1998 to establish if they still existed and if the still employed 25 or more employees. 
1,215 workplaces met these criteria. For WERPS98, a subset of 846 continuing workplaces 
were re-surveyed with an identical questionnaire and some supplementary questions about 
any changes that may have taken place in the intervening period. WERS98 obtained 
information from the senior manager responsible for employment relations, a senior worker 
rep and a sample of employees in 2161 workplaces with 10 or more employees. To maintain 
comparability between WIRS90 and WERS98, this paper only considers WERS98 responses 
from the 1,929 workplaces with 25 or more employees.  
 The great strength of the WERS/WIRS series are the high response rates; at least 75 
per cent for each survey. Further information on the data can be found in Millward et al 
(2000: 3 – 10). Both WIRS90 and WERS98 were based on stratified random samples, large 
workplaces were over sampled in both years and workplaces in particular industrial sectors 
                                                                                                                                                        
as part of the 1998 WERS survey, so these data cannot be used to study change over time. 
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were over sampled in 1998. This means that probability weights need to be applied to the 
data in order to obtain estimates that are representative of the population from which the 
samples were drawn. Because the dependent variable of interest here is aggregate union 
density (not mean workplace union density) the data were re-weighted to account for each 
workplace’s overall employment share. The analyses reported below were carried out on the 
WIRS90 and WERS98 cross-sections. Information from the WERS98 panel was used to 
identify which WIRS90 workplaces were still in existence in 1998, and which had closed or 
fallen below 25 employees in size. Some supplementary analyses were carried out on the full 
panel to probe the nature of change within continuing workplace. To facilitate analysis, the 
1990 sample was divided into workplaces which had closed or fell below 25 employees by 
1998 (leavers) and continuing workplaces still in business and still employing more than 25 
employees. The 1998 sample was split between workplaces that had opened or grown from 
below 25 employees since 1990 (joiners) and workplaces that had been in existence with 25 
or more employees since 1990. The criteria that were used to divide the data in this way are 
set out in Forth (2000). Note that missing data on age of establishment and previous 
employment levels reduces the size of the 1998 sample. However Forth’s research suggests 
that there were no significant differences between workplaces that supplied this information 
and workplaces that did not. 
 The BHPS is a longitudinal survey of individual adults (aged 16 and over) 
respondents who lived in stratified random sample of 5,538 households in 1991. The 
fieldwork is carried out by NOP in conjunction with the ESRC Longitudinal Studies Centre at 
the University of Essex. If individuals leave a household, they are followed to their new 
household and all adults resident in the new household join the sample. Children join the 
sample when they reach the age of 16. At wave one, interviews were achieved in 74 per cent 
of eligible households, and 92 per cent  of eligible individuals were interviewed. 69.6 per cent 
of wave one respondents were still participating in the survey at wave seven. Wave one 
fieldwork was carried out from September to December 1991, with a small numbers of hard 
to reach individuals being interviewed in the early months of 1992. The majority of the field 
work for wave seven was carried out between September and December 1997, with 
interviews continuing until June 1998. The BHPS questions individuals on a broad range of 
subjects. Topics of particular interest for the purposes of this paper include; current 
employment status and job information, work histories, individual demographics and values 
and opinions. Questions are rotated, so not all questions are asked in every wave. Some union 
membership questions and a question on attitudes towards unions are only asked in the odd 
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waves (i.e. 1, 3, 5 etc.) For this reason, the analyses reported here focus on waves one and 
seven (1991 – 1997) rather than waves one and eight (1991 – 1998). The subsequent analyses 
are based on those individuals who responded at waves one and seven and are weighted in 
order to correct for differential selection probabilities, household and individual non-response 
and sample attrition. Further details of the survey and weighting methods can be found in 
Taylor et al (2001). The data were divided between continuing employees, respondents who 
were employees in 1991 but not 1997 (leavers) and respondents who were employees in 1997 
but not in 1991 (joiners)6. A fourth category of ‘switchers’ – continuing employees who 
moved between the public and private sectors – was also created  to allow for separate 
analysis of the public and private sectors.  
 Before the analysis can proceed it is first important to establish how well WERS and 
the BHPS measure decline in union membership density. Data for this task comes from the 
LFS, a large (around 138,000 respondents) household survey conducted by the Office for 
National Statistics for the purpose of providing the UK government with accurate labor 
market statistics7. The survey was conduc ted biannually from 1973 – 1982, annually from 
1983 – 1991 and quarterly since 1992. The LFS has contained a question on trade union 
membership since 1989. Table 1 compares the proportion of employees unionized across 
these three surveys. 
 The results reported in Table 1 confirm that WERS and the BHPS do provide an 
accurate picture of the decline in union density during the period 1990 – 1998. However, 
closer inspection of the data reveals some important discrepancies that need to be borne in 
mind when interpreting the results. The BHPS fails to capture the fact that the private sector’s 
relative employment share grew, while the relative employment share of the public sector 
shrank (this difference is apparent from looking at Figure 1, which sets out the structures of 
the data-sets). If this compositional change turns out to be a factor in union decline, then the 
BHPS will underestimate its importance. Also in the BHPS, there are a larger number of 
1991 employees who left employment by 1997 than there are 1997 employees who were not 
in employment in 1991. This is at odds with what was actually going on in the population 
over this period; overall employment in Britain grew by 1.5 per cent (Insalaco, 2002: 83), 
which means that joiners must have outnumbered leavers. Therefore the BHPS will overstate 
                                                 
6 The pre and post employment activities of leavers and joiners are set out in Table A1. 
7 Both the LFS and the BHPS measures of union membership are based on employee reports of union 
membership status. It is possible that employees incorrectly report their memb ership status. However there is no 
British equivalent to the 1977 validation study of the US Current Population Survey, which allowed Farber and 
Western (2001) to correct for classification error in their study of US membership decline. 
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the importance of change in continuing employees compared to differences between leavers 
and joiners. 
 
 
5.  Methodology 
 
The first step in the analysis is to estimate separate regression models of the determinants of 
union membership for 1990 and 1998 (using the WERS data) and 1991 and 1997 (using the 
BHPS data). For the WERS data, a weighted least squares estimator was used. This can be 
written as: 
 
itititititit
ititititititit
)Con|Comp()Con|Bar()Con|c(Re
)Con|Comp()Con|Bar()Con|c(ReUnion
ebbb
bbb
+==+==+==
+==+==+===
000
111
          (1) 
 
Where Union is union density in workplace i at time t. Con is a 0/1 dummy with the value of 
unity if workplace i was operating in both 1990 and 1998. Therefore the notation shows that 
separate coefficients were estimated on the parameters for continuing and non-continuing 
samples. Rec is a 0/1 dummy with the value of unity if workplace i recognized unions at time 
t. Bar indicates the proportion of the workforce in workplace i covered by collective 
bargaining at time t. Comp indicates the composition of the workforce and related factors like 
workplace size in workplace i at time t. E is an error term 
 For the BHPS, weighted linear probability models were estimated. This can be written 
as: 
 
itititititit
ititititititit
ConCompConUattConUjob
ConCompConUattConUjobUnion
ebbb
bbb
+==+==+==
+==+==+===
)0|()0|()0|(
)1|()1|()1|(
              (2) 
   
Where Union is a 0/1 dummy with the value of unity if individual i is a union member at at 
time t. Ujob is a 0/1 dummy with the value of unity if individual i was in a job covered by 
union representational arrangements at time t. Uatt represents the individuals attitudes 
towards unions at time t and Comp are the individual and job related characteristics of 
individual i at time t. Con is a 0/1 dummy with the value of unity if individual i was an 
employee in both 1991 and 1997.  
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 The choice of estimator reflected the form of the dependent variable in each data-set. 
See the appendix for further details of the econometric techniques. Chi2 parameter tests on 
preliminary analyses revealed that the results were significantly different for the public and 
private sectors. Consequently separate models were estimated for each of these sectors8. Once 
satisfactory models had been estimated, multivariate shift-share analyses were conducted 
using the results9. This method has been used to analyze the broad causes of union decline by 
Bryson and Gomez (2002) and Green (1992). Machin (2002) and Riddell and Riddell (2001) 
use the comparable Oaxaca (1973) decomposition technique. The notation is as follows10: 
 
? U = (X98 - X90) ß 90 + (ß98 – ß90)X90  + (X98-X90)(ß98 – ß90)    (3) 
 
Where U is union density, ß is the vector of the coefficients from the regression model and ?  
is the sample mean. The error terms are dropped from the equations because of the standard 
assumption that the means of the error terms equal zero. The first term ((X98 - X90) ß 90) is the 
effect of compositional change keeping propensity to unionize at 1990 levels. The second 
term ((ß98 – ß90)X90  ) is the effect of changing propensity to unionize if composition is held at 
1990 levels. Since in reality, neither propensity to unionize nor composition were held at 
1990 levels, the results of the first two terms will not necessarily sum to the observed decline 
in union density. The third term ((X98-X90)(ß98 – ß90)) balances the equation so that the results 
are consistent with the observed drop in density in the samples (Green, 1992: 454). Note that 
not all workplaces and individuals answered all of the questions used in the multivariate 
analysis. Workplaces and individuals that did not provide answers to all of the questions 
could not be included in the analyses. For this reason, the figures for observed decline in 
union density in the sample reported in the results tables below are slightly different from 
those reported in Table 1. 
 
 
                                                 
8 To facilitate this analysis for individuals in the BHPS, a third group of independent variables was added to 
Equation 2:  
)1|()0|()1|( ==+==+==+ itititititit SwitchCompSwitchUattSwitchUjob bbb  
Where switch is a 0/1 dummy with the value of unity if individual i switched from a public sector job to a 
private sector job (or vice versa) between 1991 and 1997. 
9 The full regression results and the mean values of the variables can be found in Tables A2 and A3 in the 
appendix. 
10 This notation is for the WERS analysis. For the BHPS, the years (in superscript) are 1991 and 1997 rather 
than 1990 and 1998. 
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6.  Results  
 
6.1  Results from workplaces 
 
To begin with the WERS/WIRS results, compositional change played a minor role in the 
decline in density (the key factor behind compositional change was the growing employment 
share of the private sector). The effects of compositional change were largely offset by within 
group behavioral change, predominantly among public sector professionals, who became 
more likely to unionize. At first glance, decline in opportunities to unionize appeared to 
account for just over half of the observed decline. The major factor here was declining union 
bargaining coverage in continuing workplaces, not lower levels of recognition and coverage  
in joiners compared to leavers. Analysis of the panel reveals the processes behind this drop in 
union bargaining coverage. The key factor was the total abandonment of collective 
bargaining in one in three private sector workplaces that had practiced collective bargaining 
in 1990. Yet just 2 per cent of these workplaces had formally de-recognized a trade union(s), 
so non-functioning recognition agreements and often some form of union representation 
structure remained in place in these workplaces11.  
 The precise processes involved in decline in collective bargaining coverage suggest 
that decline in coverage has not result in reduced opportunities to unionize. Rather, by putting 
a stop to the collective activity that is central to the bargaining process management acted to 
undermine the social custom of union membership, effectively removing the incentive to 
unionize. In the majority of cases unions retained an institutional presence in workplaces 
where bargaining had been abandoned, and both the survey and case evidence suggests that 
in the absence of formal de-recognition, the majority of workers who were previously 
covered by bargaining retained the opportunity to unionize  (Brown et al, 1999). Furthermore, 
the decline associated with the removal of collective bargaining cannot really be called 
increased free-riding, because non-members are not getting the benefit of union negotiated 
pay-rises. These findings are compatible with the case evidence (Brown et al, 1999; 
Fairbrother, 2000), which suggests that in most workplaces it was the exercise of managerial 
power which led to the removal of bargaining. Any ‘withering of enthusiasm’ for unions on 
the part of the workforce was a response to the assertion of managerial prerogatives.  
                                                 
11 This issue of de-collectivisation of pay determination in Britain is explored more fully in Charlwood (2003b). 
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 The secondary factor, accounting for just over one third of the observed decline in 
density, was behavioral change among those with an unambiguous opportunity to unionize. 
This behavioral change was evident in joiners compared to leavers and in continuing 
workplaces. From this we can infer that there was a substantial growth in the number of free-
riders between 1990 and 1998, and that this growth contributed significantly to union decline. 
The relative importance of decline in propensity to unionize and decline in opportunities to 
organize varied between sectors. In the private sector, just under two thirds of decline was 
accounted for by reduced opportunities (or perhaps more accurately, reduced incentives) to 
unionize compared to one third due to falling propensities to unionize. While in the public 
sector, around half of the decline was due to falling propensities to unionize and half due to 
compositional change. Declining opportunities to unionize  played little role in accounting for 
decline. The effects of falling opportunities to unionize in continuing workplaces were offset 
by increasing opportunities to unionize in joiners compared to leavers.  
 
6.2 Results from a panel of individuals 
 
Overall, the BHPS results tell a similar story to the WERS results. Composition appears to 
have played a minimal role, with compositional change unfavorable to unions among joiners 
compared to leavers balanced out by favorable compositional change among continuing 
employees. It should be noted that because the BHPS understates employment growth and 
fails to pick up the relative growth of the private sectors employment share, the role of 
compositional change may be understated. Increased free-riding among continuing 
employees accounted for around 30 per cent of the overall decline while  around 20 per cent  
could be attributed to increased free-riding among new employees compared the workers that 
they replaced. The other half of the decline was explained by reduced opportunities to 
unionize among new employees compared to employees who left employment. These results 
suggest that the growth of free-riding was relatively more important than the results from 
workplaces suggest. There are two likely explanations for the discrepancy. First, many 
apparent free-riders may be in workplaces where collective bargaining has been abandoned, 
so they are not actually covered by union bargaining arrangements, although they may think 
that they are because some sort of union representational system still exists in their 
workplace. Second, the BHPS results may affected by sample selection and attrition bias.  
 The role of changing attitudes towards trade unions in union decline was relatively 
trivial. As has already been noted, aggregate attitudes towards unions became generally more 
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favorable over the course of the 1990s. As a result of this change, workers with favorable 
attitudes towards unions became less likely to unionize. This suggests that it was union 
weakness and ineffectiveness rather than anti-union attitudes on the part of the workforce 
which explains increased free-riding. However, joiners had attitudes towards unions that were 
notably less favorable than leavers. The net effect of this difference on union decline was 
small; it accounted for just one tenth of one per cent of the overall decline in density.  
Although this figure may be understated (due to sample selection bias), it is apparent that 
changing attitudes towards unions do not satisfactorily explain union decline.  
 In the private sector, reduced opportunities to unionize among new workers compared 
to leavers accounted for around half of the decline in union densit y. Increased free-riding 
among both new and continuing employees explained around one quarter and compositional 
change among new employees compared to leavers accounted for the remainder. The key 
factors underlying this compositional change were the growing employment share of 
employees on temporary contracts, the growing employment share of workers who entered 
the labor market after 1980 and a smaller proportion of workers with favorable attitudes 
towards trade unions. In the public sector increased free-riding accounted for around four 
fifths of the decline. Joiners had much lower levels of union availability than leavers, but this 
was largely balanced out by increased opportunities to unionize among switchers and 
continuing employees and favorable compositional change.  
 The panel nature of the BHPS allows some light to be shed on the individual level 
processes underlying union decline and particularly the growth in free-riding. Table 4 shows 
the factors associated with a change in membership status among continuing employees. 90 
per cent of the continuing employees who remained in union jobs but left union membership 
also changed jobs. Just 10 per cent remained in the same union job and left union 
membership. Taken together with the results from workplaces, these figures suggest that 
increased free-riding among continuing employees occurred predominantly among 
employees who switched jobs into three specific areas. First, new workplaces without the 
‘social custom’ of union membership. Second, weakly organized continuing workplaces in 
the public sector where unions were unable to uphold the social custom of joining among 
new employees. Third, continuing workplaces in the private sector where management 
removed the incentives for unionization by abandoning collective bargaining.  
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7.  Conclusion 
 
This paper has analyzed the factors that accounted for declining aggregate trade union density 
in Great Britain between 1990 and 1998 using a theoretical framework that distinguished 
between decline that resulted from change in opportunities to unionize compared to decline 
that resulted from changing propensities to unionize. This framework was operationalized 
using micro-data from workplaces and a panel of individuals.  
 The most important factor in explaining union decline during the 1990s appeared to 
be falling opportunities to unionize. However, closer inspection of the results revealed a more 
complicated picture. In contrast to the 1980s, decline was driven by change in continuing 
workplaces which had had collective bargaining in 1990, but had abandoned it by 1998. A 
little less than one in three continuing workplaces fell into this category. Around half of the 
decline in aggregate union density could be accounted for by behavioural this change. In 
most of these workplaces, unions retained some sort of institutional presence, so the 
opportunity to unionise still existed. However workers in these workplaces who were not 
union members cannot be properly described as free-riders because they were no longer 
covered by union negotiated terms and conditions.  
 Also in contrast to the 1980s, increased free-riding played a significant factor role in 
union decline. Free-riding became more common in the public sector, and was more common 
in newly established workplaces that recognised unions for bargaining purposes than it had 
been in workplaces that had had union recognition and closed. Lower levels of union 
recognition in new workplaces (the key factor behind union decline in the 1980s according to 
Disney et al, 1995) explained just under a tenth of the decline in union density in the 1990s. 
Compositional change played only a minimal role. 
 The results from individuals help to flesh out the individual level processes behind the 
workplace level results. Only one in employee in ten who remained in the same union 
throughout the period left union membership. However, new employees in union jobs were 
less likely to join a union than the workers that they replaced. Workers who switched jobs 
into a job where they had the opportunity to unionize were less likely to take up that 
opportunity even if they had been union members in their previous jobs. However, 
employees’ general attitudes towards unions over this period actually became more 
favourable, so it is unlikely that this change in behaviour can be explained by the rise of a 
new ‘spirit of acquisitive individualism’ or ‘withering of enthusiasm’ for union membership 
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on the part of employees. Instead it seems that there were a growing number of union 
workplaces, specifically; workplaces where collective bargaining was abandoned, public 
sector workplaces and new workplaces that recognised unions, where collective activity 
declined as management realised that union weakness meant that they no longer had to 
bargain with trade unions. The result of this change was that unions were unable to uphold 
the social custom of union membership among a small minority of their existing members, 
and among new employees entering the workplace. 
 Unions will struggle to reverse this membership decline because results imply that to 
do so, they will need to do two things. First, sign up free-riders by rebuilding the social 
custom of union membership at the workplace. Second, re-establish bargaining in workplaces 
where management abandoned collective bargaining as a method of pay determination. A key 
mechanism for achieving these objectives is successful collective action. However, the costs 
of successful collective action have risen, and the benefits have fallen as a result of 
intensifying product market competition and legislative restrictions on the exercise of union 
power that show no sign of being reversed. In this environment, re-establishing what Bain 
(1970) described as the ‘virtuous circle’ of successful collective action leading to rising 
membership leading to further union success will be an extremely difficult challenge for 
unions.  
 British unions are responding to this tougher environment by learning from the ‘social 
movement’ approach of North American trade unionism. However, this approach has not yet 
succeeded in reversing decline (although it may have stopped membership falling further – 
this is an issue for future research once the next Workplace Employee Relations Survey data 
becomes available). Evidence from other liberal market economies in North America and 
Australasia, where union movements are more advanced in their use of social movement 
tactics suggests that a social movement approach will not in itself bring about a reviva l in 
union fortunes (Kochan, 1979). Similarly the ‘social partnership’ approach advocated as a 
renewal strategy by an influential stand of opinion within the British trade union movement 
seems to hold little promise after so many employers have signaled to unions that they are no 
longer interested in maintaining any kind of bargaining relationship. Therefore I conclude by 
echoing the recent judgments of Pencavel (about Britain) and Farber and Western (about the 
United States). It is hard to envisage a reversal of union fortunes in Britain without 
substantial changes to the economic and public policy environment.  
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8.  Appendix 
 
The full results of the regression analyses and the mean values of the independent variables 
used in the shift-share analyses can be found in tables A2  (for WERS/WIRS) and A3 (for the 
BHPS). 
 
8.1  Estimation issues 
 
The key drawback of the linear probability model used for the analysis of the determinants of 
individual union membership in the BHPS is that it can produce estimated probabilities of 
union membership fall outside of the 0-1 range when this is not actually possible for values to 
fall outside this range in the real world (Kennedy, 1998: 233-4). An alternative would be to 
estimate a logit or probit model, which would have the advantage that estimated probabilities 
would fall within the 0 – 1 range. However the results of these models do not lend themselves 
to use in multi-variate shift share analysis, so the linear probability model is preferred (Green, 
1992: 454). 
 The weighted least squares estimator used in the analysis of the WERS/WIRS data is 
also technically inappropriate because the dependent variable (union density) is not normally 
distributed. The key problem is that the data are left censored, i.e. there are a large number of 
observations (workplaces) where union density is 0. The interval regression technique  
provides an alternative estimator that can account for the left censored data (in the same 
manner as a tobit model, see Kennedy, 1998: 250-1) while allowing the data to be weighted, 
something which the software package used in the analysis (Stata 7) does not allow with a 
tobit model. The results of the interval regressions can be used in multi-variate shift share 
analysis. However the results of an interval regression based shift share analysis need to be 
interpreted as components of the decline in aggregate density in workplaces where density is 
greater than zero rather than the components of decline in aggregate density. For this reason I 
prefer to focus on the results based on the weighted least squares estimates. The two sets of 
results are broadly consistent with each other. The interval regression results are not reported 
here for reasons of space, but are available from the author on request. 
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Table 1: Union decline in Britain 1990 – 1998 
 
 NUMBER OF UNION 
MEMBERS (CERTIFICATION 
OFFICER) 
AGGREGATE UNION 
DENSITY (LFS) 
 
AGGREGATE DENSITY 
(BHPS) 
AGGREGATE UNION 
DENSITY (LFS 
WORKPLACES WITH 
>25 EMPLOYEES) 
AGGREGATE UNION 
DENSITY 
(WIRS/WERS) 
All      
1990  9,947,000  38.1% -  47%  47% 
1991  9,585,000  37.5% 37.7% - - 
1997   30.2% 30.2%   
1998  7,807,000  - -  37%  36% 
Decline -2,140,000 -7.3 -7.5 -10% -11% 
Private sector 
only 
     
1990 -  -  - -  37.6 
1991 - - 26.7 -  
1997   20.3% -  
1998 -  19%  -  26%  29.1%  
Public sector 
only 
     
1990 - - - - 72 
1991 -  62.8% - - 
1997   55.6% - - 
1998 - 61 - 63 57 
 
Sources: Bird et al. (1992), Cully and Woodland (1998), Hicks (2000), Millward et al. (2000) and the authors own calculations from the BHPS. 
Notes: BHPS fieldwork was carried out in the final quarter of each year with a small minority of difficult to arrange interviews taking place in 
the first six months of the following year. WERS90 fieldwork carried out between January and September 1990. WERS 98 fieldwork carried out 
between November 1997 and July 1998. Fieldwork for the 1990 and 1991 LFSs took place in the spring quarter while fieldwork for the 1997 and 
1998 LFSs fieldwork took place in the autumn quarter. 
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Table 2: The components of decline in aggregate workplace union density (WERS) 
 STRUCTURAL 
CHANGE 
(X98  - X90)? 90 
BEHAVIOURAL CHANGE 
(? 98 – ? 90)X90 
INTERACTION TERM 
(X98-X90)(? 98 – ? 90) 
OBSERVED DECLINE IN AGGREGATE UNION 
DENSITY 
(X98-X90)? 90 + (? 98 – ? 90)X90 + (X98-X90)(? 98 – ? 90) 
ALL      
Continuing workplaces     
Union availability -7.53 -5.62 4.46 -8.89 
Workforce composition -1.17 3.91 0.07 2.81 
Leavers cf. joiners     
Union availability -1.4 -4.09 0.36 -5.13 
Workforce composition -0.99 1.85 0.67 1.54 
Total -10.1 -5.8 4.9 -10.99 
PRIVATE SECTOR     
Continuing workplaces     
Union availability -5.31 -3.99 4.16 -5.21 
Workforce composition -0.11 2.94 0.78 3.62 
Leavers cf. joiners     
Union availability -3.81 -3.32 0.97 -6.16 
Workforce composition -0.78 -0.52 0.73 -0.58 
Total -10 -4.89 6.56 -8.32 
PUBLIC SECTOR     
Continuing workplaces     
Union availability -7.5 -12.5 6.26 -13.73 
Workforce composition -1.86 6.88 -0.38 4.65 
Leavers cf. joiners     
Union availability 8.28 -5.61 -8.15 -5.49 
Workforce composition -3.2 4.49 2.39 3.67 
Total -4.28 -6.74 0.12 -10.9 
Calculated from the means and coefficients reported in Table A1. 
Structural change can be interpreted as the impact of changes in the proportion of workers with the opportunity to unionise and the proportion of workers in each group on 
union decline if within group propensity to unionise is held constant at the 1990 level. Behavioural change can be interpreted as the impact of changes in within group 
propensity to unionise if composition is held constant at the 1990 level. The sum of behavioural change and structural change is greater than the observed decline in density. 
The interaction term has the effect of balancing the equation so that the total equals the observed decline in union density. 
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Table 3: The components of decline in aggregate union density among individual employees (BHPS) 
 
 STRUCTURAL 
CHANGE 
(X98  - X90)? 90 
BEHAVIOURAL CHANGE 
(? 98 – ? 90)X90 
INTERACTION TERM  
(X98-X90)(? 98 – ? 90) 
OBSERVED DECLINE IN AGGREGATE UNION 
DENSITY 
(X98-X90)? 90 + (? 98 – ? 90)X90 + (X98-X90)(? 98 – ? 90) 
ALL      
Continuing workplaces     
Union availability 1 -2.1 -0.1 -1.2 
Workforce composition 2 0 0.1 2 
Leavers cf. joiners     
Union availability -4.3 -1.4 0.6 -5.1 
Workforce composition -2 0 0.8 -1.2 
Total -3.3 -3.5 1.5 -5.3 
PRIVATE SECTOR     
Continuing workplaces     
Union availability -0.1 -1.6 0.01 -1.7 
Workforce composition 0.7 1 0.01 1.7 
Leavers cf. joiners     
Union availability -3.6 -0.9 0.3 -4.2 
Workforce composition -1.9 -0.5 1.1 1.3 
Switchers     
Union availability 0.2 0.3 -0.1 0.4 
Workforce composition 0 -0.5 0.5 0 
Total -5 -2.2 1.9 -5.3 
PUBLIC SECTOR     
Continuing workplaces     
Union availability 1.4 -2.5 -0.1 -1.2 
Workforce composition 2.4 3.2 0.2 5.9 
Leavers cf. joiners     
Union availability -6 -7.2 3.1 -10.1 
Workforce composition -1.1 2.5 -0.2 1.2 
Switchers      
Union availability 0.8 0.1 0.2 1.1 
Workforce composition 0.6 -3.2 -0.8 -3.4 
Total -2 -7.1 2.4 -6.7 
 
Calculated from the means and coefficients reported in Table A2.
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Table 4: Factors associated with changes in union membership status  
among continuing employees 
 
 % 
Flows out of union membership  
Change jobs to a non union job 63.7 
Change jobs to a different union job 30.2 
Same job but union status of job changes 2.4 
Same job, same union status of job 3.7 
Flows into membership  
Change jobs to a union job 83 
Same job but union status of job changes 2 
Same union (union) job, join union 15 
 
Source: British Household Panel Survey, waves one and seven 
Weighted base: 147 (outflows) 118 (inflows) 
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Table A1: Activities of leavers and joiners  
 
 JOINERS ACTIVITY AT 
WAVE 1 (%) 
LEAVERS ACTIVITY AT 
WAVE 7 (%) 
Self-employed 19 18 
Unemployed 24 11 
Retired 2 38 
Family care/ maternity 
leave 
26 11 
Full- time education/ 
training 
26 17 
Other 3 5 
 
Source: British Household Panel Survey 
Weighted base: 538 (joiners) and 787 (leavers).  
 
24 
Table A2: The determinants of aggregate union density and mean values for the independent variables used in the models (WIRS/WERS) 
 
 All    Private 
Sector 
   Public 
Sector 
   
 
 
Continuing 
workplaces 
Regression 
results 1990 
Mean 
value 
1990 
Regression 
results 1998 
Mean 
value 
1998 
Regression 
results 1990 
Mean 
value 
1990 
Regression 
results 1998 
Mean 
value 
1998 
Regression 
results 1990 
Mean 
value 
1990 
Regression 
results 1998 
Mean 
value 
1998 
% part-time 
 
Occupation 
(ref. senior 
managers and 
professionals) 
 
% unskilled 
manual 
 
% semi-skilled 
manual 
 
% skilled 
manual 
 
 
% non-manual 
 
% covered by 
collective 
bargaining  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.041 
(0.038) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.071 
(0.053) 
 
0.071 
(0.059) 
 
0.110 
(0.056) 
 
0.012 
(0.063)* 
 
0.496 
(0.046)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
11 
 
 
10 
 
 
30 
 
 
42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.186 
(0.034)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.012 
(0.054) 
 
0.094 
(0.051)* 
 
0.249 
(0.083)*** 
 
-0.047 
(0.050) 
 
0.068 
(0.032)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
12 
 
 
9 
 
 
29 
 
 
28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.062 
(0.03)** 
 
 
 
 
 
0.103 
(0.04)** 
 
0.128 
(0.039)*** 
 
0.160 
(0.044)***
  
0.026 
(0.045) 
 
0.760 
(0.027)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
 
13 
 
 
12 
 
 
24 
 
 
28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.087 
(0.035)** 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.039 
(0.061) 
 
0.115 
(0.058)** 
 
0.318 
(0.099)*** 
 
0.002 
(0.058) 
 
0.164 
(0.045)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
16 
 
 
12 
 
 
26 
 
 
21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.131 
(0.075)* 
 
 
 
 
 
0.056 
(0.090) 
 
0.031 
(0.126) 
 
0.184 
(0.093)** 
 
0.017 
(0.090) 
 
0.286 
(0.08)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
8 
 
 
7 
 
 
40 
 
 
67 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.419 
(0.087)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
0.161 
(0.083)* 
 
0.097 
(0.087) 
 
0.012 
(0.108) 
 
-0.042 
(0.069) 
 
-0.063 
(0.043) 
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11 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
37 
 
 
46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
 
Workplace with 
union 
recognition 
 
Production 
sector (ref. 
Services) 
 
Workplace size 
(ref. 201 – 499 
employees) 
 
25 – 49 
employees 
 
50 – 199 
employees 
 
500+ employees 
 
 
Private sector 
(ref. Public 
sector) 
 
Leavers and 
joiners 
 
% part-time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 90 
 
18.906 
(3.633)*** 
 
 
4.577 
(1.436)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.636 
(2.234)* 
 
0.606 
(1.927) 
 
-1.269 
(2.027) 
 
-13.773 
(2.072)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.069 
(0.041) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
90 
0.52 
 
 
 
0.26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.14 
 
 
0.29 
 
 
0.21 
 
 
0.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 98 
 
42.329 
(2.645)*** 
 
 
-2.326 
(2.138) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-2.943 
(2.309) 
 
-2.092 
(1.999) 
 
0.623 
(2.815) 
 
-15.327 
(2.678)** 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.113 
(0.044)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
98 
0.47 
 
 
 
0.28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.12 
 
 
0.26 
 
 
0.24 
 
 
0.54 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 90  
 
2.212 
(1.796) 
 
 
1.606 
(1.237) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-3.066 
(1.570) 
 
-0.738 
(1.430) 
 
1.153 
(1.629) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.100 
(0.043)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
90 
0.4 
 
 
 
0.36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.13 
 
 
0.3 
 
 
0.16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 98 
 
37.125 
(3.111)*** 
 
 
-1.200 
(2.208) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-5.111 
(2.308)** 
 
-4.423 
(2.082)** 
 
3.435 
(2.988) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.095 
(0.041)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
98 
0.37 
 
 
 
0.38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.11 
 
 
0.26 
 
 
0.21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 90 
 
15.637* 
(8.487) 
 
 
-1.402 
(3.914) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.954 
(4.905) 
 
5.596 
(4.452) 
 
-0.470 
(3.772) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.061 
(0.116) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
90 
0.81 
 
 
 
0.06 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.17 
 
 
0.27 
 
 
0.29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 98 
 
29.224 
(6.978)*** 
 
 
-15.655 
(6.789)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.187 
(6.045) 
 
5.116 
(4.624) 
 
-0.444 
(5.251) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.194 
(0.154) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
98 
0.72 
 
 
 
0.03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.15 
 
 
0.23 
 
 
0.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
 
% unskilled 
manual 
 
% semi-skilled 
manual 
 
% skilled 
manual 
 
% non-manual 
 
 
Production 
sector 
 
25 – 49 
employees 
 
50 – 199 
employees 
 
500+ 
employees 
% covered by 
collective 
bargaining 
 
workplace with 
union 
recognition 
 
workplace with 
no union 
recognition 
 
 
 
ß 90 
 
-0.064 
(0.060) 
 
-0.022 
(0.060) 
 
0.018 
(0.074) 
 
-0.162 
(0.072)** 
 
-2.287 
(2.273) 
 
1.165 
(3.337) 
 
-0.312 
(3.245) 
 
1.887 
(3.691) 
 
0.723 
(0.056)*** 
 
14.251 
(10.501) 
 
 
7.409 
(7.947) 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
90 
4 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
6 
 
 
0.08 
 
 
0.07 
 
 
0.07 
 
 
0.02 
 
 
9 
 
 
0.12 
 
 
 
0.07 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 98 
 
0.070 
(0.078) 
 
0.201 
(0.074)** 
 
0.077 
(0.083) 
 
0.078 
(0.073) 
 
-3.602 
(3.573) 
 
-0.852 
(3.829) 
 
-3.057 
(3.924) 
 
-6.685 
(5.637) 
 
0.088 
(0.047)* 
 
25.522 
(8.572)*** 
 
 
-12.775 
(9.073) 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
98 
3 
 
 
3 
 
 
2 
 
 
11 
 
 
0.04 
 
 
0.08 
 
 
0.08 
 
 
0.03 
 
 
8 
 
 
0.11 
 
 
 
0.13 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 90 
 
0.029 
(0.061) 
 
0.073 
(0.061) 
 
0.121 
(0.084) 
 
-0.057 
(0.076) 
 
-2.102 
(2.451) 
 
-0.517 
(3.924) 
 
-1.845 
(3.923) 
 
1.544 
(4.121) 
 
0.760 
(0.049)*** 
 
8.480 
(8.037) 
 
 
7.470 
(7.293) 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
90 
6 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
7 
 
 
0.13 
 
 
0.09 
 
 
0.09 
 
 
0.03 
 
 
10 
 
 
0.13 
 
 
 
0.12 
 
 
 
ß 98 
 
-0.026 
(0.058) 
 
0.144 
(0.052)** 
 
0.009 
(0.062) 
 
0.036 
(0.053) 
 
-3.714 
(3.112) 
 
-4.710 
(3.807) 
 
-4.292 
(3.974) 
 
6.133 
(5.539) 
 
0.163 
(0.058)*** 
 
35.365 
(7.842)*** 
 
 
0.899 
(6.807) 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
98 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
3 
 
 
11 
 
 
0.06 
 
 
0.1 
 
 
0.09 
 
 
0.01 
 
 
5 
 
 
0.07 
 
 
 
0.18 
ß 90 
 
-0.409 
(0.169)** 
 
-0.222 
(0.098)** 
 
-0.271 
(0.133)* 
 
0.377 
(0.13*** 
 
2.191 
(4.846) 
 
8.555 
(6.916) 
 
0.059 
(5.557) 
 
-1.463 
(10.331) 
 
0.620 
(0.13)*** 
 
23.990 
(18.937) 
 
 
-11.353 
(11.936) 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
90 
2 
 
 
0.61 
 
 
0.99 
 
 
4 
 
 
0.01 
 
 
0.04 
 
 
0.03 
 
 
0.004 
 
 
11 
 
 
0.08 
 
 
 
0.01 
 
ß 98 
 
0.347 
(0.149)** 
 
0.442 
(0.179)** 
 
0.560 
(0.138)*** 
 
0.135 
(0.129) 
 
18.341 
(14.012) 
 
13.196 
(8.652) 
 
-4.568 
(7.595) 
 
-16.245 
(7.349)** 
 
-0.078 
(0.067) 
 
5.399 
(15.162) 
 
 
-12.161 
(15.202) 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
98 
2 
 
 
0.9 
 
 
1 
 
 
11 
 
 
0.003 
 
 
0.05 
 
 
0.06 
 
 
0.06 
 
 
14 
 
 
0.21 
 
 
 
0.01 
 
 
27 
private sector 
 
 
Constant 
-10.097 
(2.795)*** 
 
13.381 
(5.148)*** 
 
0.15 -11.823 
(4.825)** 
 
24.451 
(4.287)*** 
0.18  
 
 
-2.398 
(3.342) 
 
 
 
3.996 
(4.573) 
 
 
 
31.404 
(9.28)*** 
 
 
 
47.464 
(9.180)*** 
N 1631 1631 1403 1403 1139 
 
1139 1009 1009 492 492 394 394 
R2 0.78  0.65  0.87  0.71  0.41  0.27  
 
* = Statistically significant at the 10% level 
** = statistically significant at the 5% level 
*** = statistically significant at the 1% level 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
 
Mean values which were percentages were rounded to the nearest whole number, mean values which were probabilities were rounded to two decimal places. Regression 
coefficients and standard errors were rounded to three decimal places. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
Table A3: The determinants of union membership and mean values for the independent variables used in the models (BHPS) 
 
 All    Private 
sector 
   Public 
sector 
   
 
 
Regression 
results 
1991 
Mean 
value 
1991 
Regression 
results 
1997 
Mean 
value 
1997 
Regression 
results 
1991 
Mean 
value 
1991 
Regression 
results 
1997 
Mean 
value 
1997 
Regression 
results 
1991 
Mean 
value 
1991 
Regression 
results 
1997 
Mean 
value 
1997 
Continuing 
Employees 
 
Unionised job 
 
Workplace 
characteristics 
 
Public Sector 
 
 
Production 
sector 
 
Workplace 
employs more 
than 100 
 
Job 
characteristics 
 
Part-time 
employee 
 
Permanent 
contract 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.575 
(0.020)*** 
 
 
 
0.075 
(0.023)*** 
 
-0.060 
(0.019)*** 
 
0.046 
(0.018)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.070 
(0.021)*** 
 
0.120 
(0.030)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 .42      
 
 
 
 
0.23      
 
 
0.24       
 
 
0.31 
       
 
 
 
 
 
0.17 
 
 
0.7  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.525 
(0.020)*** 
 
 
 
0.064 
(0.023)*** 
 
-0.027 
(0.018) 
 
0.051 
(0.017)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.052 
(0.021)** 
 
0.132 
(0.037)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.43  
 
 
 
     
0.27 
 
       
0.24 
 
       
0.36 
 
 
 
 
 
       
0.19 
 
 
0.78 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.573 
(0.024)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.060 
(0.020)*** 
 
0.055 
(0.021)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.014 
(0.023) 
 
0.053 
(0.034) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.26  
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
0.3  
 
      
0.27  
 
 
 
 
 
    
0.12  
 
     
0.63 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.514 
(0.025)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.023 
(0.019) 
 
0.062 
(0.021)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
0.012 
(0.023) 
 
0.027 
(0.048) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
0.32 
 
        
0.31 
 
 
 
 
 
       
0.13 
 
       
0.72 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.576 
(0.042)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.039 
(0.097) 
 
0.021 
(0.036) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.176 
(0.043)*** 
 
0.271 
(0.067)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
0.02 
 
       
0.29   
 
 
 
 
 
     
0.19 
 
     
0.59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.533 
(0.048)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.067 
(0.104) 
 
0.033 
(0.034) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.106 
(0.041)** 
 
0.159 
(0.073)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.61  
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
0.02  
 
      
0.32  
 
 
 
 
 
      
0.21  
 
      
0.64 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
Occupation 
(ref. 
managerial and 
professional) 
 
 
Non-manual 
 
 
Skilled 
 
 
Semi-skilled 
 
 
Unskilled 
 
Individual 
characteristics 
 
Male 
 
 
Highest 
educational 
qualification 
(ref. any school 
qualifications) 
None 
 
 
Higher 
education 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1991 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.018 
(0.021) 
 
0.040 
(0.030) 
 
0.132 
(0.031)*** 
 
-0.022 
(0.035) 
 
 
 
0.038 
(0.017)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.036 
(0.021)* 
 
0.028 
(0.019) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1991 
 
 
 
 
0.36       
 
 
0.1    
 
 
0.08      
 
 
0.06 
 
 
 
 
0.41      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.13 
 
 
0.23     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1997 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.041 
(0.019)** 
 
0.031 
(0.030) 
 
0.015 
(0.032) 
 
-0.035 
(0.036) 
 
 
 
0.025 
(0.018) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.008 
(0.023) 
 
0.020 
(0.017) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1997 
 
 
 
 
0.38 
 
 
0.09 
 
      
0.08 
 
       
0.06 
 
 
 
 
0.44  
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
0.12  
 
      
0.35  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1991 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.025 
(0.024) 
 
0.043 
(0.032) 
 
0.123 
(0.034)*** 
 
-0.100 
(0.043)** 
 
 
 
0.037 
(0.020)* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.025 
(0.022) 
 
-0.000 
(0.023) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1991 
 
 
 
 
0.29  
 
 
0.13  
 
      
0.1 
 
       
0.04 
 
 
 
       
0.42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.13 
 
       
0.16  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1997 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.011 
(0.022) 
 
0.053 
(0.031)* 
 
0.044 
(0.035) 
 
-0.085 
(0.044)* 
 
 
 
0.043 
(0.021)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.001 
(0.024) 
 
-0.000 
(0.020) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1997 
 
 
 
 
0.32  
 
     
0.12  
 
      
0.1  
 
      
0.04  
 
 
 
       
0.46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.13  
 
       
0.26  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1991 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.010 
(0.045) 
 
-0.014 
(0.107) 
 
0.028 
(0.144) 
 
0.123 
(0.080) 
 
 
 
0.024 
(0.039) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.116 
(0.069)* 
 
0.074 
(0.041)* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1991 
 
 
 
 
0.37  
 
    
0.03 
 
       
0.01 
 
       
0.06  
 
 
 
    
0.26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.08  
 
     
0.29  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1997 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.063 
(0.040) 
 
-0.102 
(0.115) 
 
-0.207 
(0.221) 
 
0.048 
(0.070) 
 
 
 
-0.020 
(0.039) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.003 
(0.064) 
 
0.035 
(0.040) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1997 
 
 
 
 
0.37  
 
       
0.02 
 
      
0.01 
 
       
0.05 
 
 
 
      
0.27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.07  
 
     
0.38  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
 
Ethnic 
Minority 
 
Approximate 
date of labour 
market entry 
(ref. before 
1968) 
 
1968 – 1979 
 
 
Post 1980 
 
 
 
Attitudes 
towards unions 
 
 
Believes strong 
unions protect 
workers 
 
 
Does not 
believe that 
strong unions 
protect 
workers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1991 
 
0.020 
(0.043) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.010 
(0.018) 
 
-0.070 
(0.020)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.103 
(0.020)*** 
 
 
 
-0.018 
(0.021) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1991 
0.02 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.26 
 
 
0.24  
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.37       
 
 
 
 
0.24 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1997 
 
0.008 
(0.047) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.008 
0.018) 
 
-0.068 
(0.020)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.166 
(0.019)*** 
 
 
 
-0.018 
(0.020) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1997 
0.02  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
0.28 
 
 
0.27 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.41    
 
 
    
 
0.20   
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1991 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.028 
(0.021) 
 
-0.076 
(0.023)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.110 
(0.023)*** 
 
 
 
-0.003 
(0.023) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1991 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.22  
 
 
0.23   
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
0.30 
 
 
 
 
0.23 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.036 
(0.020)* 
 
-0.061 
(0.023)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.145 
(0.023)** 
 
 
 
-0.007 
(0.021) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
0.24 
 
       
0.27  
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
0.32 
 
 
 
 
0.22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1991 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.054 
(0.037) 
 
-0.002 
(0.053) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.044 
(0.049) 
 
 
 
-0.078 
(0.056) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1991 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
0.26 
 
    
0.13 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
0.37 
 
 
 
 
0.18 
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.021 
(0.038) 
 
0.063 
(0.045) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.195 
(0.045)*** 
 
 
 
-0.084 
(0.059) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
0.27 
 
 0.14 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
0.42 
 
 
 
 
0.12 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
Leavers/ 
Joiners 
 
Unionised job 
 
 
 
 
Non-union job 
 
 
Workplace 
characteristics 
 
Public Sector 
 
 
Production 
sector 
 
Workplace 
employs more 
than 100 
 
Job 
characteristics 
 
Part-time 
employee 
 
Permanent 
contract 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1991 
 
 
0.582 
(0.055)*** 
 
 
 
0.029 
(0.044) 
 
 
 
 
0.092 
(0.040)** 
 
0.008 
(0.033) 
 
0.035 
(0.032) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.086 
(0.033)*** 
 
0.137 
(0.037)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1991 
 
0.13       
 
 
 
 
0.11 
 
 
 
 
 
0.07       
 
 
0.08       
 
 
0.09   
 
 
 
     
 
 
0.08       
 
 
0.22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1997 
 
 
0.491 
(0.072)*** 
 
 
 
0.004 
(0.055) 
 
 
 
 
0.089 
(0.048)* 
 
-0.058 
(0.037) 
 
-0.019 
(0.039) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.051 
(0.038) 
 
0.104 
(0.043)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1997 
 
0.05  
 
 
 
 
0.12 
 
 
 
 
 
0.04   
 
     
0.04 
 
       
0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
       
0.07   
 
    
0.15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1991 
 
 
0.550 
(0.059)*** 
 
 
 
-0.024 
(0.044) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.017 
(0.033) 
 
0.033 
(0.037) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.075 
(0.036)** 
 
0.110 
(0.040)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1991 
 
0.1  
 
 
 
 
0.15   
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.1   
 
 
0.09 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.08  
 
 
0.23 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1997 
 
 
0.498 
(0.092)*** 
 
 
 
-0.048 
(0.071) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.042 
(0.035) 
 
-0.012 
(0.037) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.041 
(0.032) 
 
0.105 
(0.046)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1997 
 
0.04   
 
 
 
 
0.15  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
0.06 
 
       
0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.07  
 
      
0.17  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1991 
 
 
0.685 
0.125)*** 
 
 
 
0.215 
(0.129)* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.047 
(0.182) 
 
0.037 
(0.061) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.154 
(0.075)** 
 
0.109 
(0.085) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1991 
 
0.18 
 
 
 
 
0.04  
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
0.01 
 
       
0.09 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.07 
 
    
0.19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1997 
 
 
0.324 
(0.131)** 
 
 
 
0.002 
(0.112) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.484 
(0.161)*** 
 
-0.103 
(0.088) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.260 
(0.085)*** 
 
0.097 
(0.088) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1997 
 
0.09 
 
 
 
 
  0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
<0.01 
 
       
0.04 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.07 
 
         
0.11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 
Occupation 
(ref. 
managerial and 
professional) 
 
 
Non-manual 
 
 
Skilled 
 
 
Semi-skilled 
 
 
Unskilled 
 
 
Individual 
characteristics 
 
Male 
 
Highest 
educational 
qualification 
(ref. any school 
qualifications) 
 
 
None 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1991 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.004 
(0.040) 
 
-0.009 
(0.051) 
 
0.103 
(0.051)** 
 
-0.011 
(0.053) 
 
 
 
 
0.013 
(0.031) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.032 
(0.032) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1991 
 
 
 
 
0.12       
 
 
0.03      
 
 
0.03       
 
 
0.03       
 
 
 
 
 
0.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.08  
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1997 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.012 
(0.041) 
 
0.005 
(0.049) 
 
0.052 
(0.077) 
 
-0.012 
(0.049) 
 
 
 
 
0.028 
(0.038) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.020 
(0.033) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1997 
 
 
 
 
0.09 
 
       
0.02  
 
      
0.01  
 
      
0.02 
 
 
 
 
       
0.09 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.03  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1991 
 
 
 
 
 
0.044 
(0.046) 
 
0.056 
(0.050) 
 
0.142 
(0.055)** 
 
0.017 
(0.059) 
 
 
 
 
0.024 
(0.034) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.049 
(0.035) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1991 
 
 
 
 
0.12 
 
 
0.04 
 
      
0.04 
 
 
0.03 
 
      
 
 
 
0.13  
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
 
0.08 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1997 
 
 
 
 
 
0.022 
(0.033) 
 
0.019 
(0.044) 
 
0.056 
(0.073) 
 
0.014 
(0.040) 
 
 
 
 
0.080 
(0.034)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.001 
(0.033) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1997 
 
 
 
 
0.1  
 
      
0.02  
 
      
0.02 
 
 
0.02  
 
 
 
 
      
0.11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
0.04   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1991 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.085 
(0.071) 
 
-0.322 
(0.167)* 
 
0.027 
(0.091) 
 
-0.056 
(0.105) 
 
 
 
 
-0.007 
(0.066) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.020 
(0.079) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1991 
 
 
 
 
0.12  
 
     
0.01  
 
     
0.01 
 
 
0.03  
 
 
 
 
     
0.1  
 
 
 
 
 
    
   
 
0.06 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1997 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.033 
(0.092) 
 
0.265 
(0.149)* 
 
0.464 
(0.182)** 
 
-0.112 
(0.145) 
 
 
 
 
-0.016 
(0.089) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.014 
(0.096) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1997 
 
 
 
 
0.08 
 
       
<0.01 
 
      
<0.01 
 
 
0.01 
 
 
 
 
      
0.04  
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
0.01  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
 
Higher 
education 
 
Ethnic 
minority 
 
Approximate 
date of labour 
market entry 
(ref. before 
1968) 
 
 
1968 – 1979 
 
 
Post 1980 
 
 
Attitudes 
towards unions 
 
 
Believes strong 
unions protect 
workers 
 
 
Does not 
believe that 
strong unions 
protect 
workers 
 
 
 
 
ß 1991 
 
0.009 
(0.037) 
 
-0.070 
(0.075) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.109 
(0.036)*** 
 
-0.105 
(0.035)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
0.155 
(0.034)*** 
 
 
 
-0.021 
(0.037) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1991 
0.05       
 
 
0.01       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.04       
 
 
0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.13       
 
 
 
 
0.07 
 
ß 1997 
 
0.035 
(0.033) 
 
0.070 
(0.092) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.006 
(0.038) 
 
-0.015 
(0.036) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.116 
(0.037)*** 
 
 
 
0.029 
(0.039) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1997 
0.08 
 
       
0.01   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
0.05  
 
      
0.09 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.1   
 
 
   
   
0.04 
 
ß 1991 
 
-0.042 
(0.042) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.130 
(0.041)*** 
 
-0.108 
(0.038)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
0.120 
(0.037)*** 
 
 
 
0.006 
(0.040) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1991 
0.05 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
0.05 
 
 
0.07  
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.13 
 
       
 
 
0.08 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1997 
 
0.001 
(0.031) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.028 
(0.035) 
 
-0.030 
(0.033) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.013 
(0.035) 
 
 
 
-0.052 
(0.038) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1997 
0.07  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
     
0.05 
 
 
0.1  
 
 
 
 
 
      
0.1 
 
 
      
 
0.05  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1991 
 
0.097 
(0.072) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.039 
(0.078) 
 
-0.103 
(0.091) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.231 
(0.079)*** 
 
 
 
-0.085 
0.088) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1991 
0.07 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
0.03 
 
 
0.03 
 
 
 
 
 
        
0.13 
 
 
        
 
0.05  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1997 
 
0.111 
(0.107) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.140 
(0.097) 
 
0.046 
(0.092) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.327 
(0.084)*** 
 
 
 
0.276 
(0.138)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1997 
0.09  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.04 
 
 
0.08  
 
 
 
 
 
      
0.09  
 
 
 
      
0.02  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
 
Switchers 
(between 
public and 
private sectors) 
 
 
 
Unionised job 
 
 
 
Non-union job 
 
Workplace 
characteristics 
Public Sector 
 
Production 
sector 
 
Workplace 
employs more 
than 100 
 
Job 
characteristics 
 
Part-time 
employee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1991 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.626 
(0.109)*** 
 
 
-0.076 
(0.096) 
 
 
 
 
0.024 
(0.085) 
 
-0.066 
(0.080) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.049 
(0.058) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1991 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.02  
 
 
 
0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
0.02 
 
       
0.02   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.03  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.579 
(0.101)*** 
 
 
0.007 
(0.080) 
 
 
 
 
-0.016 
(0.084) 
 
0.032 
(0.077) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.096 
(0.082) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.03   
 
  
    
0.04 
 
 
 
 
 
0.02 
 
      
0.03  
 
 
 
 
 
    
   
0.02  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1991 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.412 
(0.121)*** 
 
 
-0.040 
(0.145) 
 
 
 
 
0.009 
(0.098) 
 
0.124 
(0.085) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.117 
(0.089) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1991 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.11 
 
   
    
0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
0.03  
 
      
0.07 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
0.07 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.411 
(0.133)*** 
 
 
0.034 
(0.130) 
 
 
 
 
-0.026 
(0.237) 
 
0.057 
(0.089) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.175 
(0.075)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.14  
 
   
   
0.03 
 
 
 
 
 
0.01  
 
     
0.08  
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
0.06 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
 
Permanent 
contract 
 
Occupation 
(ref. 
managerial and 
professional) 
 
 
Non-manual 
 
 
Skilled 
 
 
Semi-skilled 
 
 
Unskilled 
 
Individual 
characteristics 
 
Male 
 
Highest 
educational 
qualification 
(ref. any school 
qualifications) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1991 
 
0.121 
(0.061)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.024 
(0.074) 
 
-0.008 
(0.156) 
 
0.046 
(0.108) 
 
0.019 
(0.087) 
 
 
 
0.038 
(0.068) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1991 
0.06 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.04 
 
 
0.01   
 
 
0.01 
 
 
0.01 
 
       
 
 
0.02 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1997 
 
0.152 
(0.077)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.009 
(0.095) 
 
0.171 
(0.096) 
 
0.139 
(0.102) 
 
0.107 
(0.141) 
 
 
 
0.016 
(0.069) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1997 
0.06  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
0.03 
 
 
0.01 
 
       
0.01  
      
 
0.01 
       
 
 
 
0.04  
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1991 
 
0.249 
(0.101)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.057 
(0.086) 
 
0.049 
(0.128) 
 
0.086 
(0.114) 
 
-0.137 
(0.130) 
 
 
 
0.151 
(0.107) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1991 
0.12  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
0.06 
 
 
0.01 
 
      
0.01 
 
       
0.03 
 
 
   
 
0.07 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ß 1997 
 
0.163 
(0.084)* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.097 
(0.105) 
 
-0.120 
(0.237) 
 
-0.248 
(0.237) 
 
0.040 
(0.136) 
 
 
 
0.131 
(0.110) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
1997 
0.15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
0.09 
 
 
0.01 
 
       
0.01 
 
      
0.03  
 
 
 
 
0.05  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
 
None 
 
 
Higher 
education 
 
Approximate 
date of labour 
market entry 
(ref. before 
1968) 
 
1968 – 1979 
 
 
Post 1980 
 
Attitudes 
towards unions 
 
Believes strong 
unions protect 
workers 
 
Does not 
believe that 
strong unions 
protect 
workers 
 
 
 
Constant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.095 
(0.040)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.120 
(0.045)*** 
 
ß 1991 
 
0.036 
(0.051) 
 
0.006 
(0.073) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.015 
(0.056) 
 
-0.013 
(0.059) 
 
 
 
 
0.088 
(0.065) 
 
 
0.009 
(0.067) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.057 
(0.045) 
 
Mean 
1991 
0.01 
 
 
0.02  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.02  
 
 
0.03 
 
 
 
 
 
0.04  
 
 
 
0.02 
 
ß 1997 
 
-0.138 
(0.110) 
 
0.031 
(0.057) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.033 
(0.100) 
 
-0.185 
(0.092)** 
 
 
 
 
0.127 
(0.075) 
 
 
0.038 
(0.090) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.066 
(0.054) 
 
Mean 
1997 
0.01 
 
 
0.03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.02 
 
 
0.03 
 
 
       
 
 
0.04       
 
 
 
0.01 
 
ß 1991 
 
0.062 
(0.099) 
 
0.178 
(0.083)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.059 
(0.094) 
 
-0.115 
(0.075) 
 
 
 
 
0.115 
(0.082) 
 
 
-0.040 
(0.103) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.081 
(0.082) 
 
Mean 
1991    
0.03 
 
 
0.04 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.03  
 
 
0.05  
 
 
 
 
 
0.07 
 
 
 
0.04 
 
ß 1997 
 
0.067 
(0.109) 
 
0.109 
(0.087) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.130 
(0.093) 
 
-0.141 
(0.102) 
 
 
 
 
0.096 
(0.079) 
 
 
-0.083 
(0.129) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.042 
(0.087) 
 
Mean 
1997 
 
0.02 
 
0.08 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.05  
 
  
0.08  
 
 
 
 
 
 0.1   
 
 
 
0.02 
 
N 3208 3208 3054 3054 2208 2208 2063 2063 1016 1016 1005 1005 
R2 0.52  0.47  0.55  0.49  0.32  0.34  
37 
* = Statistically significant at the 10% level 
** = statistically significant at the 5% level 
*** = statistically significant at the 1% level 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
 
Mean values which were probabilities were rounded to two decimal places. Regression coefficients and standard errors were rounded to three decimal places. The ethnic 
minority dummy variable was not used in public sector and private sector models due to the low number of observations with this characteristic.  
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Figure 1: Structure of the Data 
 
   WERS/ WIRS         BHPS 
     1990      1998        1991      1997 
 
% of aggregate         % of aggregate  % of sample          % of sample 
  employment            employment    (weighted)           (weighted) 
  (weighted)           (weighted) 
           20        21 
 
 
47        53 
 
          4        5 
 
35        22 
 
          47        51 
 
15        19  
 
          5        5 
 
4        7 
 
          7        5 
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Public sector 
continuing 
workplaces  
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Private sector 
joiners 
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Public sector 
joiners  
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Continuing 
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(private sector) 
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Continuing 
employees 
(public sector) 
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Switchers 
(public to private 
sectors)  
144 
Switchers 
(private to 
public)  
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Public sector 
leavers 
228 
Private sector 
leavers  
608 
Private sector 
joiners  
422 
 
Public sector 
joiners  
145 
 
Switchers 
(private to 
public)  
172 
 
Continuing 
employees 
(private sector) 
1657 
 
Switchers 
(public to private 
sectors)  
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Continuing 
employees 
(public sector) 
688 
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